MARKET MAKER OR MARKET BREAKER EVALUATING THE LIQUIDITY EFFECTS OF THE ETF MARKET MAKER INCENTIVE SCHEME BY THE TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE by Gispen Joep Albert
 
 
<MSc Degree Thesis> 
AY 2019 
 
MARKET MAKER OR MARKET BREAKER 
EVALUATING THE LIQUIDITY EFFECTS OF THE ETF 
MARKET MAKER INCENTIVE SCHEME BY THE TOKYO 
STOCK EXCHANGE 
 
57171504-6  JOEP ALBERT GISPEN 
MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE 





In July 2018, the Japan Exchange Group implemented a Market Maker incentive 
scheme aimed at improving the liquidity of exchange-traded funds (ETFs) traded on the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). In the present paper, I evaluate the effects on liquidity of 
ETFs backed by Market Makers within the programme. In addition, I analyse the 
potential impact of the Bank of Japan’s ETF purchasing programme on the Market Maker 
incentive scheme. I adopt a difference-in-differences design combined with one-to-one 
matching with replacement to analyse the effects of the programme. The results show a 
 
 
lasting, lowering effect on raw spread of Market Maker ETFs, which is in line with the 
extant literature predicting lower raw bid-ask spread and higher limit order fill rate when 
total exchange fee decreases. Furthermore, I find that for ETFs that were likely 
participants before the introduction of the programme, the liquidity improved greatly 
after the announcement of the opening of applications to the incentive scheme. Moreover, 
the results suggest that Market Maker ETFs backed by a TSE Asset Manager sponsorship 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
In July 2018, the Japan Exchange Group (JPX) introduced a Market Maker incentive 
scheme aimed at improving the liquidity of specific exchange-traded funds (ETFs) traded 
on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). The incentive scheme means to increase the 
liquidity of ETFs that encourage diversified investment, and its quote obligations and 
incentive are designed around this goal.  
The Tokyo Stock Exchange market structure allows for limit orders as well as market 
orders. An investor who submits a limit order, i.e. a price and quantity at which he wishes 
to buy or sell a security, is called a “market maker”. Conversely, an investor who buys at 
the maker’s quoted price, i.e. places a market order, is called a “market taker”. Market 
makers run the risk of non-execution of their order, resulting in welfare loss. Hollifield, 
Miller, Sandås, & Slive (2006) suggest that up to three quarters of a limit order market 
structure’s welfare loss stems from non-execution of limit orders. With a lack of limit 
orders, fewer securities will be traded and liquidity will decrease. In maker-taker pricing 
models, market makers receive a rebate on their fees, while takers finance this through 
their respective fees. Considering Foucault and Colliard’s (2012) model, the breakdown 
of the total fee is neutral, and thus whether a market maker or a market taker finances the 
majority of the total exchange fee should not matter for market efficiency. In the present 
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research however, rebates for market makers are financed by the Japan Exchange Group, 
leaving takers unaffected. In such a case, the theory predicts improved liquidity for 
securities as the total exchange fee decreases.  
The present research analyses the effects on ETF liquidity as a consequence of the 
introduction of the incentive scheme. The simultaneous implementation of the scheme on 
a large group of ETFs, as well as a group with no changes in exchange fees allows for a 
difference-in-differences design for the estimation of the effect. I perform a cross-section 
fixed effect panel regression on a sample based on one-to-one matching with replacement. 
The results show that the implementation of the incentive scheme has led to improved 
spreads for Market Maker ETFs. Furthermore, the opening of the applications had a 
larger impact on both spread and depth than the implementation of the scheme itself.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the theoretical framework on 
which this paper rests its hypotheses. Section 3 expands on the data and methodology 
used, while section 4 looks at the results. Section 5 provides interpretations, limitations 




CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Section 1. EXTANT LITERATURE MAKER-TAKER PRICING 
Colliard and Foucault (2012) initially developed a model predicting the effect of 
maker-taking pricing on both cum fee bid-ask spread and raw spread. Cum fee bid-ask 
spread refers to the bid-ask spread adjusted for fees paid by market takers. They 
demonstrated that only a net change in total exchange fee will influence cum fee spread 
and limit order fill rate. If maker rebates are financed by taker fees, the cum fee spread 
will not alter. For unadjusted or raw bid-ask spread, the model predicts a spread decrease 
when the market maker’s fee decreases, but a spread increase when the market taker’s fee 
falls. Malinova and Park (2015) provided supporting evidence for the model. In their 
study of the effects of the introduction of a market maker rebate at the Toronto Stock 
Exchange that was financed through taker fees had no effect on the cum fee bid-ask 
spread of the stocks, although raw spread decreased. Harris (2013) showed that 
maker-taker pricing does in fact affect quoted spread, suggesting that quotations do not 
necessarily reflect net value of a stock. Lutat (2010) studied the effect of maker-taker 
pricing in European electronic trading systems, and was unable to confirm an effect on 
spread. This is in line with the predictions of Colliard and Foucault’s model, as in Lutat’s 
situation maker rebates were financed by taker fees, keeping total exchange fees constant. 
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Brolley & Malinova (2013) empirically demonstrated that in general, only total exchange 
fee changes will have an economic impact, as predicted by the Colliard & Foucault 
(2012) model. However, they showed that when takers finance the maker rebate through 
flat fees per transactions, there is a net economic effect that improves liquidity and 
volume of stocks, but decreases investor participation. Black (2018) showed that larger 
maker-taker pricing models where maker rebates are financed by taker investors increase 
market efficiency and improve retail investor participation. In the present research, 
market maker rebates and incentives are paid by the Japan Exchange Group, or in case of 
sponsorship by an asset manager. As such, total exchange fees will decrease, which 
should have a lowering effect on raw bid-ask spread. Furthermore, limit order fillings are 
predicted to increase, leading to a higher depth for an ETF participating in the incentive 
scheme.  
 
Section 2. TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE MARKET MAKER INCENTIVE SCHEME 
Section 2.1. Quoting Obligations 
The Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) introduced its Market Maker Incentive Scheme in 
July 2018, with initial applications starting in April 2018 (Japan Exchange Group, 
2018/2019). The scheme targets ETFs, excluding ETNs and inversed or leveraged ETFs.  
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The TSE imposes a continuous quote obligation, consisting of three facets (Japan 
Exchange Group, 2018/2019):  
1. Number of ETFs for quoting, depending on the ETF type. The conditions are as follows 
a. At least 30 ETFs, 20 being illiquid 
 Illiquid is defined by the TSE as an average daily volume of less than JPY 
100 million. ETFs that track the TOPIX, Nikkei 225, or JPX Nikkei 400 
are never considered illiquid regardless of average daily volume. It is 
important to note that the illiquidity measurement status is kept even if 
average daily volume rises to above JPY 100 million after the application.  
b. At least 15 ETFs tracking foreign indices. The reduced number for foreign index 
ETFs is to encourage diversified investment.  
c. At least 10 illiquid domestic index ETFs along with at least 10 foreign index ETFs.  
2. Quoting time the Market Maker must show is at least 80% of the time during continuous 
auction. 
3. Spread and minimum quantity obligations, based on ETF types (Japan Exchange Group, 






Quoting obligations for ETFs in Market Maker Incentive Scheme. 





Max. Bid-ask spread, largest 




A Nikkei 225, TOPIX, JPX 
Nikkei 400 
20 bps / 2 ticks JPY 30 million 
B Domestic stocks or REITs 50 bps / 3 ticks JPY 10 million 
 
C Foreign indices 
 
50 bps / 3 ticks JPY 5 million  
D Pre-selected foreign 
indices 




Upon fulfilment of the above obligations, ETFs receive incentives based on their 
average trading value based on a three month cycle period (Japan Exchange Group, 2019). 
Furthermore, if ETFs track specified indices that encourage diversified investment, additional 
incentive is provided. The incentives progressively decrease when trading value increases, with 
0.9 bps for an ETF tracking a diversified index with a trading value of less than 100 million JPY, 
down to 0.1 bps for a similar diversified ETF with a value between 1 and 5 billion JPY. If the 
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average trading value of the ETF exceeds 5 billion JPY, they are not eligible for an incentive. 
However, they may still be included in the portfolio to meet the quoting obligations.  
Incentives are not solely based on trading value, but also on number of daily orders. 
Participating ETFs receive 0.1 bps per order for the first 100,000 orders, per ETF per day 
(Japan Exchange Group, 2019). Finally, participating Market Makers receive free-to-use 
virtual servers to handle trading traffic, based on the size of their ETF portfolio.   
Sponsorship 
In addition to the standard Market Maker incentive scheme, the Japan exchange 
Group (2019) also introduced a sponsorship system to further improve liquidity for 
certain ETFs. Under this programme, an Asset Manager selects ETFs to sponsor, 
specifies obligation and incentive terms, and applies to the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The 
Tokyo Stock Exchange then relays this application to participating Market Makers that 
have the ETF selected by the Asset Manager in their portfolio. If quotation obligations are 
met, Market Makers receive the Asset Manager’s incentives on top of the incentives 
received from the standard incentive scheme. Sponsorship incentives are either fixed per 
day or variable with daily trading volume, based on the Asset Manager’s preferences.  
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Section 3. BANK OF JAPAN 
At the monetary policy meeting of October 28th 2010, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) 
made the decision to introduce and set guidelines to an asset purchasing programme 
(Bank of Japan, 2010). The BoJ’s asset purchasing programme was to consist of a 
portfolio of assets including treasury bills, Japanese government bonds (JGBs), 
commercial papers (CPs), corporate bonds, ETFs, and Japanese real estate investment 
trusts (JREITs). While the total planned amount of purchases was to amount to 35 trillion 
JPY, 0.45 trillion yen was planned to be used for the purchase of ETFs. This was to 
increase, as by 2018, the annual planned purchases of ETFs combined amounted to 5.7 
trillion JPY (Bank of Japan, 2018). The vast majority of these purchases are for ETFs that 
track the TOPIX, Nikkei 225, and JPX Nikkei 400. However, a small percentage of these 
ETFs are to support firms in proactively investing in physical and human capital (Bank of 
Japan, 2017). 
The influence of the BoJ on the Japanese ETF market is significant. Maeda & Shino 
(2019) estimate that the ratio of BoJ’s net ETF holdings may be as high as 75% percent of 
the total net ETF assets, up from less than 3% before 2011. Thus, the Bank of Japan is an 
important factor to take into consideration when looking at ETF liquidity, as the majority 
of ETF purchases are coming from there.  
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Section 4. TRADING ON THE TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE AND TICK SIZE 
Upon placing a limit order, the prices at which orders can be placed depend on the 
possible price increments, or tick sizes. These tick sizes are determined by the price of the 
stock or security in question. If a stock is less than 3000 JPY, tick size will be 1 JPY. If the 
price is between 3000 and 5000 JPY, it increases to 5 JPY, and so on. If stocks are TOPIX 
100 constituents, tick size is lower relative to other issues (Japan Exchange Group, 2019).  
The tick size changes due to price shifts might have an influence on the 
measurement of liquidity in ETFs over time. Asymmetric shifts in tick sizes between 
matched ETFs, where one ETF but not the other in the matched pair decrease/increase in 
tick size. I elaborate more on this issue in the methodology section.  
Section 5. HYPOTHESES 
The design of the incentive scheme implies a net decrease in the total exchange fee, as 
market makers are receiving incentives while nothing changes for takers. This effect 
should be stronger in sponsored Market Maker ETFs, as the market maker rebate is larger 
in those cases. Based on the extant literature, I hypothesise the following: 
- Hypothesis 1: Raw spread will decrease for Market Maker ETFs, while remaining 
unchanged for non-Market Maker ETFs.  
- Hypothesis 2: Market depth will increase relative to non-Market Maker ETFs 
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- Hypothesis 3: Sponsorship will provide an additional improvement of liquidity for Market 






CHAPTER 3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Section 1. DATA 
Data on all listed items on the TSE is obtained from the Nikkei Tick Data database. 
I use daily quotation and transaction data from January 2018 to December 2018. This is 
firstly because as the Market Maker incentive scheme was introduced in July 2018, it 
ensures there is ample room around the implementation to measure the effect. Secondly, 
the illiquidity obligation conditions (see section 2) for candidate ETFs are based on 
volume and liquidity data running from January to March 2018.  
Section 2. SAMPLE 
I take information on listed ETFs from the Japan Exchange Group public database. 
The data are conform as of December 2018 (Japan Exchange Group, 2019). The 
securities data are filtered on the listed ETFs, resulting in an initial sample size of N = 
229.  
I firstly categorise the ETFs according to whether they are part of the 2018 MM scheme 
or not. Participants in the 2019 scheme are included as non-participants. This results in 
105 participants in the 2018 scheme and 124 non-participants. Inverted or leveraged 
ETFs are eliminated as they are not targeted by the incentive scheme. To measure the 
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effect of the incentive scheme as accurately as possible, any Bank of Japan purchase 
influences have to be controlled for. Therefore, I eliminate any ETF that track the Nikkei 
225, TOPIX, or JPX Nikkei 400 indices as these are primary targets by the Bank of 
Japan’s purchasing programme. Only the ETFs aimed at improving physical or human 
capital potentially remain in the sample.  
Similarly, incentive scheme participants are divided into sponsorship and 
non-sponsorship participants. Firstly, I determine the ETFs of which the sponsorship 
started within the sample period. The remaining ETFs include 28 ETFs of which the 
sponsorship started in July, and 11 in September, for a total of 39 sponsored Market 
Maker participants. However, since July sponsorship start dates coincide with the 
incentive scheme’s launch, only the 11 September sponsorships are taken into account.  
Section 3. MATCHED SAMPLING 
To measure the effect of the Market Maker incentive programme on liquidity, I 
used one-to-one matching with replacement, while matching ETFs on volume-weighted 
average price and volume-weighted average price multiplied by the daily volume. This 
carries more statistical power and less bias than matching by industry or stock type 
(Davies & Kim, 2007). In addition, I opted for replacement in matching due to the small 
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sample size given the limited amount of ETFs listed, in which case replacement carries 
more statistical power (Davies & Kim, 2007).  
Matches are made based on two different averages, for both volume-weighted 
average price and volume multiplied by price.  
ETFs are matched with and without incentive scheme treatment by maximising the 
following equation:  
+  
Where   and  equal the volume-weighted average price per day, while  
and  equal the volume-weighted average price times the daily trade volume for 
Market Maker and non-Market Maker ETFs,. Firstly, the average between the period of 
January and March 2018 is taken, in accordance with the benchmark period of the 
illiquidity status of a particular ETF, as well as the period before the opening of the 
applications for the programme at the start of April 2018.  
Section 4. VARIABLES 
To perform the analysis, I calculate various variables based on the matched pair 
conditions obtained previously.  
- Spread equals the percentage spread of the Market Maker ETF minus the percentage spread 
of its respective non-Market Maker matched ETF, calculated daily. Percentage spread of 
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individual ETFs are measured as the time-weighted bid-ask spread in percentages. I use this 
variable as one of the main outcome variables to measure the scheme’s effect on ETF 
liquidity. 
 
o Where  equals the daily time-weighted bid-ask spread in percentage 
for Market Maker participant ETFs, while  represents the 
non-Market Maker counterpart.  
- Depth, analogously, equals the market depth of the MM ETF minus the depth of its 
respective non-MM match. Depth is measured as the time-weighted bid and ask-side depth 
in shares. Depth is then multiplied by the individual ETFs volume-weighted average price to 
account for the difference in price level between each ETF in the pair. This is another 
outcome variable to measure the policy’s effect on liquidity.  
 
o Where equals the volume-weighted average price multiplied by the 
time-weighted bid-side depth in shares for Market Maker ETFs, and  
representing the non-Market Maker ETF equivalent.  
- DifTrade equals the ratio of the number of daily trades made between the Market Maker and 




o Where  equals the daily amount of transactions for Market Maker 
ETFs, while  equals the daily amount of transactions for non-Market 
ETFs.  
- BoJ accounts for the natural logarithm of the daily purchases of ETFs by the Bank of Japan, 
as detailed in section 2.3.The variable is calculated in Japanese yen volume. Despite 
personal inquiry, the Bank of Japan’s data on its ETF portfolio composition is confidential. 
We therefore cannot apply the BoJ variable to specific matched pairs that were or were not 
purchased by the Bank of Japan on a given day. However, it is known which type of ETFs 
the Bank of Japan purchases. Their portfolio consists mostly of TOPIX, Nikkei 225, and 
JPX Nikkei 400 ETFS, which have been excluded from the sample. There remains a small 
group, aimed at encouraging firms to invest in physical and human capital that may affect 
the current sample (Bank of Japan, 2017). Furthermore, a spill-over effect from the Bank of 
Japan purchasing ETFs might happen to spur on the ETF market as a whole.  
- Treatment is the variable representing the start of the Market Maker Incentive Scheme. It 
equals 0 in the period before the implementation of the Incentive Scheme on July 1st, and 1 
in the period afterwards.  
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- Sponsor indicates whether the Market Maker participating ETF in each matched pair has an 
additional sponsorship or not. There are two groups of sponsored ETFs within our data 
range, those of which the sponsorship started in July 2018, and those of which it started in 
September 2018. Since the former’s introduction coincides with the implementation of the 
Market Maker Incentive scheme, and thus may hinder measurements of treatment effects, 
only September sponsorships are taken into account.  
- Illiquid indicates whether a certain ETF of the MM group was considered illiquid based on 
the requirements set by the Tokyo Stock Exchange (See section 2.2). Illiquidity 
measurement benchmarks for July 2018 entrants in the Incentive Scheme were based on the 
average daily volume in the period of January to March 2018 (Japan Exchange Group, 
2018). Furthermore, applications were not open for the Market Maker Incentive Scheme 
until the start of April 2018. Therefore, the value of the illiquid variable equals 0 for all 
ETFs until April 2018, after which they equal 1 for all ETFs that meet the illiquidity 
requirements, and 0 to the others.  
- Volume-weighted average price measured as price times the amount of shares traded, 
divided by total volume. This is one of the values I use to match Market Maker and 
non-Market Maker ETFs. In addition, we multiply ETF market depth with this variable to 
adjust for differences in price levels and turn the variable into a monetary value. 
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- Price Volume equals the total daily volume (shares traded per day) of an ETF times the 
volume-weighted average price, in order to adjust volume to each ETF’s price level 
difference and make the volume comparable. Along with volume-weighted average price, 
this is one of the variables I use as a characteristics to match ETFs.  
Tick Size 
In the Section 2.4, I briefly discussed the tick size policy of the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange. This might have implications on the results of the analysis, as components of 
ETF pairs might jump in tick size unilaterally, creating an imbalance in the measurement 
of pairs of ETFs. Furthermore, different pairs could be located in different tick size 
categories, which may or may not affect their reaction to the market maker incentive 
scheme.  
Accounting for these factors poses a few challenges: Firstly, as most of the analysis 
uses the cross-section fixed effect model, time-invariant dummy variables such as 
whether ETFs belong to a certain tick size category will not be measured. Opting for a 
random model to deal with this causes a large loss in statistical power and consistency, 
given the Hausman tests and the R-squared values of the random effect model regressions 
I did perform. In addition, eliminating pairs with an asymmetric tick size might lead to 
eliminating pairs that are in fact well-matched. For example, if the Market Maker ETF 
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has a volume-weighted average price (VWAP) of 3005 JPY, while the non-Market Maker 
ETF has a VWAP of 2998 JPY, they are a close match in terms of price but would be 
eliminated based on their different tick sizes.  
After careful consideration of these arguments, I decided to take the potential tick size 
differences as a limitation to the research, and thus not account for them within the 
current model. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Below in Table 2 are the means of the key variables for each month in the year 
2018. The data is separated by participants and non-participants in the Market Maker 
incentive programme. The high variance in means can be explained by the fact that ETFs 
in either the treatment or control group are not necessarily close in price or volume. The 
one-to-one matching will account for these discrepancies by matching only ETF pairs 










Descriptive statistics of Market Maker and non-Market Maker ETFs (Matched 
pool) 
Market Maker Averages (2018 sample period) 
 Spread Depth Trade VWAP LogPV 
January 0.0053 8,613,022 46.32 9364.85 14.41 
February 0.0066 7,827,625 43.92 8352.71 14.20 
March 0.0049 7,818,944 29.92 7218.10 13.92 
April 0.0049 8,672,529 25.31 6857.51 13.74 
May 0.0043 19,219,213 23.88 7309.85 13.88 
June 0.0038 17,952,958 27.01 7562.27 13.89 
July 0.0029 14,149,373 28.51 7947.84 13.98 
August 0.0026 13,409,059 26.33 7145.05 13.85 
September 0.0027 13,600,914 28.53 7673.74 14.22 
October 0.0031 14,971,557 34.82 8223.86 14.41 
November 0.0025 12,648,572 33.49 7535.67 14.14 
December 0.0030 11,834,342 48.03 8008.28 14.35 
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Non-Market Maker Averages 
 Spread Depth Trade VWAP LogPV 
January 0.0075 1,573,947 26.49 9789.81 14.45 
February 0.0095 1,263,226 25.50 9683.43 14.26 
March 0.0109 660,092.1 16.31 7781.56 13.71 
April 0.0085 652,172.6 16.22 7164.90 13.83 
May 0.0092 749,519.8 12.79 7751.64 13.84 
June 0.0092 855,471.9 17.83 6263.34 14.02 
July 0.0084 686,123.1 20.46 6982.97 13.91 
August 0.0094 637,698.9 22.86 7009.09 14.04 
September 0.0072 1,702,905 17.34 7214.34 14.04 
October 0.0094 940,575 24.36 8301.13 14.23 
November 0.0083 1,001,616 19.59 7805.32 14.11 
December 0.0099 1,084,901 25.55 7897.60 14.09 
 
Section 5. REGRESSION EQUATIONS 
To perform the panel regression on the sample, I define the equations to be used, 





Where  equals the difference in percentage spread of ETFi of the market 
maker participant group and its respective match ETFj with no market maker. 
 is the variable indicating the implementation of the market maker incentive 
programme, which equals 0 before and 1 after the event date.  controls for ETF 
purchases made by the Bank of Japan during the data period that may have a spill over 
effect on the ETFs in the data despite not being Bank of Japan targets.  equals 
the difference between the matched ETFs in daily quantity of trades completed.  
Analogously, the equation for depth becomes: 
 
Where  equals the depth multiplied by the VWAP in JPY of ETFj (market 
maker group) minus the depth of ETFi (non-market maker group).  
Sponsorship  
For measuring the effect that sponsorship exerts on ETF liquidity, we include it 
along with the incentive scheme treatment variable into the equation. The regression 





Where  and  are the spread and depth respectively of the sponsored 
ETF less the respective spread and depth of its matched non-marketing maker ETF. 
 is the treatment variable representing the incentive scheme, equalling 0 
before and 1 after its implementation. The variable  is assigned to ETFs that 
hold a sponsorship on top of their incentive scheme participation. It equals 0 before, and 1 
after its implementation, which depending on the ETF is at the first trading day of July or 
September.  represents any ETF purchases made by the Bank of Japan during the 




CHAPTER 4. RESULTS 
I perform the panel regression on three different periods of time. Firstly, I analyse 
the entire year from January to December 2018. Then, June is eliminated as upon inquiry 
to the Japan Exchange Group, it was stated that during the month of June various 
experiments with ETF market making were conducted. Thirdly, I perform the analysis for 
the period May to December, while again excluding June from the analysis. This to 
replicate internal research performed by the Japan Exchange Group regarding the effects 
of their incentive scheme. For the entire analysis, I take a significance level of α = 5%. 
To perform the analysis, I opt for the cross-section fixed effect model. This is 
because the effects of interest are time-variant. The fixed effect model removes the 
effects of time-invariant variables, and measures changes over time within each 
cross-section. The assumption here is that the time-invariant characteristics are 
uncorrelated to other individual characteristics. I check for this using the Hausman Test 
(Section 4.2).   
Section 1. LAGRANGE MULTIPLIER, BREUSCH-PAGAN STATISTIC 
The Breusch-Pagan (BP) test is used for determining linear heteroscedasticity. 
Proposed by Breusch & Pagan (1980), it tests the null hypothesis that the error variances 
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are constant. The alternative hypothesis is that the error variance changes as a function of 
one or more variables in the regression. In case of null hypothesis rejection, random effect 
model is preferred over a pooled ordinary least squares regression. The further difference 
in robustness between random or fixed effect will be determined by the Hausman test (see 
section 4.2) 
Table 3. 
Lagrange Multiplier Breusch-Pagan Results 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier Test 
January-March Matching LM Statistic p-value 
Whole Year (2018)   
-  29938.9** < 0.001 
-  190490** < 0.001 
Whole year, excluding June   
-  23666** < 0.001 
-  255450** < 0.001 
May-Dec, excluding June   
-  16214** < 0.001 
-  381798** < 0.001 
May Matching LM Statistic p-value 
Whole Year (2018)   
-  72706** < 0.001 
-  455515** < 0.001 
Whole year, excluding June   
-  59501** < 0.001 
-  381798** < 0.001 
May-Dec, excluding June   
-  28182** < 0.001 




From the above results, given that p < 0.001 < 5%on all cases the null hypothesis 
that the error variances are constant is rejected. Therefore, it is appropriate to not opt for 
pooled OLS regression. The Hausman indication test is used to further determine the 
efficiency of the Fixed Effect model compared to the Random Effect model.  
Section 2. HAUSMAN INDICATION TEST 
The Hausman test (Hausman, 1976) is employed to indicate whether a fixed effect 
or random effect regression yields more statistical power by testing whether the unique 
errors of each cross-section and the regressors are correlated. Under the null hypothesis, 
there is no correlation and thus the random effect model shows consistency and efficiency, 
while the fixed effect model shows consistency but low efficiency. If the null hypothesis 
is rejected, it indicates that the random effect model shows inconsistency, while the fixed 
effect model shows the same consistency with higher efficiency.  
The results of the Hausman test for each sample period set are summarised in Table 
4. The statistics shown are limited to the Chi-squared statistic of each equation and its 





Hausman Indication Test Results 
Hausman Indication test 
January-March Matching χ-squared p-value 
Whole Year (2018)   
-  81.63** < 0.001 
-  137.1** < 0.001 
Whole year, excluding June   
-  85.67** < 0.001 
-  144.89** < 0.001 
May-Dec, excluding June   
-  93.47** < 0.001 




Whole Year (2018)   
-  36.59** < 0.001 
-  88.14** < 0.001 
Whole year, excluding June   
-  25.30** < 0.001 
-  97.56** < 0.001 
May-Dec, excluding June   
-  21.59** < 0.001 
-  40.56** < 0.001 
 
For spread across all periods and for both matching types, as well as depth for the 
entire year time series, the Chi-squared is significant, meaning we can reject the null 
hypothesis that the random model is consistent. Thus, using the fixed effect cross-section 
 
27 
regression will lead to greater efficiency and consistency compared to the random effect 
model. Although by design the random effect model would not be viable for the present 
study as ETF pairs need to be fixed, it is useful to confirm the efficiency of the model 
through the Hausman test. 
Section 3. JANUARY-MARCH MATCHED FIXED EFFECT REGRESSION  
The results for the panel regression with January-March averaged matches is 
summarised in Panel A. 
Panel A. 
January-March-Based Matching Regression Results 
Cross-Section Fixed Effect  
 Whole Year (2018) Whole Year excl. June May-December excl. 
June 





























































       
Observations 13248 13453 12260 12394 8217 7900 
Adj. 
R-squared 




For all sample periods, the treatment variable has a significant, negative effect on spread 
difference between ETF pairs. In addition, the treatment variable has a significant, positive 
relationship with the difference in market depth multiplied by the volume-weighted average price for 
the first two sample periods. This effect turns significantly negative in the May-December sample 
period. The BoJ variable is significantly, negatively related to spread difference across all sample 
periods. The Sponsor variable has a negative effect on spread difference in the May-December sample 
period. Furthermore, it shows a negative influence on depth throughout all sample periods. The ratio 
of the difference in amount of trade transactions between ETFs is negatively related to the spread 
difference for the first two sample periods, and negative in the third sample period. At the same time, 
the effect on depth is significantly positive only in the May-December sample period. To ensure that 
results in the May to December period are consistent, I repeated the analysis with matches based on 
VWAP and yen volume averaged in the month of May.   
Section 4. MAY MATCHED FIXED EFFECT REGRESSION  
To test whether matching based on the January-March period is appropriate particularly in the 
period running from May to December 2018 (excluding June), we run another regression with 
matched samples based on the average volume-weighted average price and price multiplied by volume 




May-Based Matching Regression Results 
Cross-Section Fixed Effect  
 Whole Year (2018) Whole Year excl. June May-December excl. June 





























































       
Observations 13974 13952 12602 13952 8217 8172 
Adj. 
R-squared 
0.367 0.642 0.362 0.660 0.440 0.622 
 
 
The treatment variable has a negative effect on spread difference throughout all three sample 
periods. The effect on depth is significantly positive in the full year excluding June period, and 
negative in the May-December period. The sponsor variable holds a negative effect on spread and 
depth difference except in the June excluded full year sample period. Furthermore, BoJ shows 
significant results across the three sample periods, negatively affecting spread difference across all 
periods. The daily transactions ratio is significant throughout the entire sample. The results for the 
sample period starting in May are largely consistent with the same period using the January-March 
matches, the only exception being the DifTrade independent variable. 
 
30 
Section 5. ILLIQUIDITY VARIABLE 
The effect of the Market Maker incentive scheme on spread weakens in the May-December 
sample periods when compared to the earlier two, in particular when looking at the January-March 
based matching analysis (Panel A). Furthermore, the effect on depth flips from positive to negative 
between sample periods when January until April are excluded. Therefore, I check for a potential 
hidden variable using the illiquidity status of ETFs (lower than 100 million JPY in yen volume, see 
section 2.2). ETFs could first be registered for Market Maker incentive participation early April, and 
the illiquidity condition was based on the first three months of 2018. In addition, in our matched 
sample based on January to March average price and price multiplied by volume, only 9 Market 
Maker participant ETFs were not considered illiquid according to those conditions in that period. 
Using this information, a new time-variant dummy variable, Illiquid, can be made, equalling 0 before 
and 1 after the first of April 2018.  
The new regression equations become: 
 
 
An additional two regressions were run, from the period January to December 2018, as well 
as January to December excluding June.  
I first run the Lagrange Multiplier Breusch-Pagan test for both time series to determine the choice 
between pooled OLS and random effect cross-section regression.  
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- For the entire period, with spread as the dependent variable, the LM Breusch-Pagan statistic 
equals 20613, p < 0.001. Therefore, the null hypothesis that the error variances are constant 
is rejected.  
- For the entire period, with depth as the dependent variable, the LM Breusch-Pagan statistic 
equals 286352, p < 0.001. Therefore, the null hypothesis that the error variances are 
constant is rejected.  
- For the period excluding June, with spread as the dependent variable, the Breusch-Pagan 
statistic equals 21376, p < 0.001. Thus the null hypothesis that the error variances are 
constant is rejected.  
- For the period excluding June, with depth as the dependent variable, the Breusch-Pagan 
statistic equals 238240, p < 0.001. Thus the null hypothesis that the error variances are 
constant is rejected.  
Given these results, pooled OLS is not a good fit for the data. I then employed the Hausman test, 
analogously to the previous section, to test for the efficiency of fixed effect versus random effect 
regression.  




- For the entire period, with depth as the dependent variable, the Chi-squared equals 155.55, p 
< 0.001.  
- For the period excluding June, with spread as the dependent variable, the Chi-squared 
equals 93.64, p < 0.001  
- For the period excluding June, with depth as the dependent variable, the Chi-squared equals 
172.11, p < 0.001 
Fixed Effect 
Finally, I performed the fixed effect cross-section regression for the entire sample period as 













January-March based matching regression, illiquidity included. 
Cross-Section Fixed Effect 
 Whole Year (2018) Whole Year excl. June 

















































     
Observations 13248 13453 12260 12394 
Adj. R-squared 0.331 0.561 0.323 0.578 
 
 
The Treatment variable, representing the Market Maker incentive scheme implementation, 
has a significant, negative effect on the difference in spread between the treated and untreated ETFs. 
The Treatment variable, representing the Market Maker programme, has a significant, negative 
relationship with depth in the period including June. Analogous for the sponsor variable. The Illiquid 
variable, representing the status of illiquidity of an ETF starting at the announcement of the opening of 
applications for the programme, has a significant, negative relation to spread difference, and a positive 
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one to depth difference across all periods. Finally, the Bank of Japan purchases, represented by the 








CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Section 1. INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
Firstly, it is important to notice that the January-March based average matched pairs may not 
provide a good fundament for analysis of the period of May to December, excluding June. This may be 
because conditions in that period have changed in such a way that matches are no longer ideal. A 
similar limitation may occur in the May-based average pairs in predicting the effect on the sample for 
the entire year.  
Market Maker effect  
The effect of the introduction of the Market Maker incentive programme shows clear results 
for spread, but some ambiguity for depth at first glance. Observing the results in Panel A, the treatment 
variable is consistently negatively related to the spread dependent variable. This implies that the 
Market Maker ETF spread has become smaller relative to the non-Market Maker ETF spread, 
suggesting improved liquidity for Market Maker ETFs. This effect somewhat weakens in the 
May-December sample period. The effect on depth difference is remarkable, as the positive effect 
(implying better liquidity for Market Maker ETFs) flips to negative in the May-December sample 
period.  
To control for improper matching, I repeated the analysis for matches based on May 
averages. As observed in Panel B, the treatment variable once again shows an improvement in 
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liquidity for Market Maker ETFs when considering its effect on spread difference. The weakening 
effect in the May-December period is less, but this may be due to improper matches for the full year 
sample periods. In fact, the coefficient for both match types in the May-December sample period is 
nearly equal.  The effect on depth differences between ETFs is ambiguous, moving from no 
significant relation, to positive, to negative.  
It seems evident that a factor that played a role in the January-April period causes the effect 
of the treatment variable on depth to alter so drastically.  
Illiquidity 
To control for whether the illiquidity status combined with the opening of ETF applications 
had an effect on the results, I performed the analysis with the illiquidity variable included. The results 
once again show a significant negative relation between spread as the outcome and the introduction of 
the incentive scheme as an independent variable. This time however, the effect is much weaker in 
terms of the coefficients.  A lot of this effect seems to have been ‘captured’ when factoring in the 
illiquidity status of Market Maker ETFs. Furthermore, while the illiquidity status seems to improve 
market depth greatly, the effects are negative for both normal and sponsored Market Maker ETFs in 
the full year sample period. It suggests that the positive impact the Market Maker incentive 
programme has on participant ETFs’ liquidity was felt in anticipation of its actual implementation. 
Recall from section 2.2 that ETFs that are considered illiquid are more easily included in a Market 
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Maker’s portfolio. In addition, the initial illiquidity status of all participating ETFs in the July 2018 
start of the incentive scheme was based on the average yen-volume of the period January-March 
2018 (below 100 million JPY). The opening of applications, similarly, was announced at the start of 
April. Investors may have identified the most likely ETFs to be participants in the Market Maker 
programme after applications opened based on the respective liquidity statuses of the ETFs. The 
inflation of depth following the opening of the application procedure may have inflated depth prior to 
the actual introduction of the scheme. After the scheme was launched, depth settled back to a more 
appropriate level, even though a lasting, beneficial effect may have been provided. Table 2 shows that 
average depth multiplied by VWAP was indeed higher for a few months before the launch of the 
scheme.  
Sponsorship 
The results for sponsorship are challenging to interpret. When considering the analysis in 
Panel C, there is no significant effect on ETF pairs’ spread differences. For depth, the effects are 
negative when including June, but non-significant when excluding it. The May average based 
matching analysis (Panel B) shows that the sponsorship effect may have a beneficial effect on spread. 
The negative effects on depth may be explained by the post-announcement inflation of market depth 
for illiquid ETFs in the month of May. In addition, given that the included sponsorships all started in 
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September, the distance from the period on which matches are made and the period in which the 
change takes effect may have decreased the power of the analysis.   
June Experimentation 
As mentioned, the Tokyo Stock Exchange in private inquiry informed me that the period of 
June consisted of experiments related to the Market Maker incentive scheme on various ETFs. Some 
of the results may hint at the activities during these experiments. Observing the results of the full year 
regression including the illiquidity variable (Panel C), both the treatment and sponsor variable 
negatively affect ETF depth. However, this effect disappears once June is excluded from the sample. 
This may suggest that experimentation in June inflated market depth, after which it reverted back 
when the experiments were finished and the incentive scheme was implemented. This is further 
supported by the analyses in Panel A and Panel B. The Market Maker treatment effect on depth 
difference flips from positive to negative when January to April are excluded from the two analyses. In 
both instances, illiquidity was not included and thus any increasing effect in April was captured by the 
treatment variable. In the full year analyses, the beneficial effect of the announcement, still 
encapsulated within the treatment variable, off-set the negative impact that resulted after depth created 
in June was deflated. For instance, in panel A the coefficient for the treatment variable on depth 
increases substantially after June is excluded, but turns negative after the period before May is 
excluded. Likewise as seen in panel B, the full year including June shows no effect on depth by the 
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treatment variable. When excluding June, the effect becomes significantly positive. Finally, when 
excluding data from January to April, the effect once again turns negative. This is evidence that the 
experimentation that took place may have inflated depth of candidate participants in the Market Maker 
programme during the month of June.  
Bank of Japan 
The Bank of Japan’s ETF purchasing throughout the year shows a negative effect to the 
spread difference of ETF pairs across all periods and for all models (See Panel A, B, & C). Even when 
the illiquidity status of ETFs is considered, the results appear significant and negative regarding the 
difference in percentage spread, implying improved liquidity for Market Maker ETFs. This results is 
remarkable given the fact that only a small percentage of ETFs purchased by the Bank of Japan are 
potentially within our sample. The limitation to these results stems from the lack of ETF-specific 
purchase data by the BoJ. Therefore, it is difficult to judge the cause and scope of the effect on the 
increase in ETF liquidity by the BoJ purchase programme.  
Section 2. LIMITATIONS 
There are several limitations to the present research. First is the aforementioned precision of 
the Bank of Japan data. Not knowing the exact quantity and composition of the BoJ’s ETF purchases 
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limits the ability to analyse the confounding effect it may have on the efficacy of the Market Maker 
incentive scheme  
Another limitation is tick size. Due to the difference-in-differences design and the use of 
cross-section fixed effect regression, time-invariant tick size categories were not accounted for in the 
regression. In particular within matched ETF pairs where asymmetrical tick sizes may occur, a 
confounding effect on the results may be present. Future research with a different design accounting 
for these factors could solve this issue.  
Finally, in the sample used, sponsored ETFs included only those that started their 
sponsorship in September. This rendered the sample size of sponsored ETFs rather small (N = 11), 
which may have influenced the power of the analysis. Future research that focuses on sponsored 
Market Maker ETFs could more conclusively determine the effect sponsorship has on liquidity 
compared to regular Market Maker ETFs.  
Section 3. CONCLUSION 
This research analysed the effects on ETF liquidity caused by the introduction of the Market 
Maker incentive scheme by the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Using a one-to-one matching 
difference-in-differences design, Market Maker and non-Market Maker ETFs were compared through 
a panel regression analysis. The effects on raw spread were significantly in favour of Market Maker 
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ETF liquidity. This is in line with the established literature, which predicts decreasing spread when the 
total exchange fee decreases. A surprising result was that the opening of applications to the incentive 
scheme caused a larger improvement to spread and depth than the actual implementation itself. 
Although the lower raw spread effect was lasting, the depth reverted back substantially after the 
introduction of the programme in July relative to the post-announcement period. The Bank of Japan’s 
ETF purchasing programme also showed to significantly influence the raw spread of ETFs within the 
sample. The nature of the data meant that the scope and cause of this effect could not be accurately 
determined. 
The results in the present paper could provide useful for the Japan Exchange Group as well 
as other exchange platforms looking to introduce a similar incentive scheme to boost liquidity. 
Additionally, potential Market Makers or Asset Managers can make a more informed decision on 
whether or not to participate in an incentive scheme aimed at boosting liquidity. Future research could 
focus more on the Bank of Japan’s influence on these results, as this may otherwise hinder the 
generalisability of these findings. Furthermore, additional research focused on sponsored Market 
Maker ETFs could provide more conclusive evidence for the potential added benefit of sponsored 

















[2] Bank of Japan. (2010), Operational Guidelines for “Asset Purchase Program,”Attachment 1 in 
the Statement on Monetary Policy, October 28, 2010, Bank of Japan 
[3] Bank of Japan. (2017). Special Rules for Purchases of ETFs to Support Firms Proactively 
Investing in Physical and Human Capital. 
https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/measures/term_cond/yoryo91.htm/ 
[4] Bank of Japan. (2018). Outline of Purchases of ETFs. 
https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2018/rel180731h.pdf 
[5] Bank of Japan. Principal Terms and Conditions for Purchases of ETFs and J-REITs. http: 
//www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/measures/term_cond/yoryo85.htm/ 
[6] Black, J. (2018). The impact of make-take fees on market efficiency. Available at SSRN 
3161786. 
[7] Breusch, T. S., & Pagan, A. R. (1980). The Lagrange multiplier test and its applications to model 
specification in econometrics. The review of economic studies, 47(1), 239-253. 
[8] Brolley, M., & Malinova, K. (2013). Informed trading and maker-taker fees in a low-latency limit 
order market. Available at SSRN 2178102. 
[9] Colliard, J. E., & Foucault, T. (2012). Trading fees and efficiency in limit order markets. The 
Review of Financial Studies, 25(11), 3389-3421. 
[10] Davies, R. J., & Kim, S. S. (2009). Using matched samples to test for differences in trade 
execution costs. Journal of Financial Markets, 12(2), 173-202. 
[11] Harris, L. (2013). Maker-taker pricing effects on market quotations. USC Marshall School of 
Business Working Paper. Avalable at http://bschool. huji. ac. il/. 
upload/hujibusiness/Maker-taker. pdf. 
[12] Hausman, J. A. (1978). Specification tests in econometrics. Econometrica: Journal of the 
econometric society, 1251-1271. 
[13] Hollifield, B., Miller, R. A., Sandås, P., & Slive, J. (2006). Estimating the Gains from Trade in 
Limit‐Order Markets. The Journal of Finance, 61(6), 2753-2804. 





[15] Japan Exchange Group. (2018). TSE Now Accepting Applications for ETF Market Makers 
https://www.jpx.co.jp/english/news/1031/20180402-51.html 
[16] Japan Exchange Group. (2019) Listed Issues [ETFs] 
https://www.jpx.co.jp/english/equities/products/etfs/issues/01.html 
[17] Japan Exchange Group. (2019). ETF Database 
https://www.jpx.co.jp/english/equities/products/etfs/investors/index.html 
[18] Japan Exchange Group. (2019). The conditions of the sponsored ETF Market Making 
https://www.jpx.co.jp/english/equities/products/etfs/market-making/03.html 
[19] Lutat, M. (2010). The effect of maker-taker pricing on market liquidity in electronic trading 
systems–empirical evidence from European equity trading. Available at SSRN 1752843. 
[20] Maeda, K., & Shino, J. (2019). Stock Lending Market and the BOJ’s ETF purchasing program: 
Micro-Evidence from ETF Balance Sheet Data and Equity Repo Trading Data. 
[21] Malinova, K., & Park, A. (2015). Subsidizing liquidity: The impact of make/take fees on market 






January-March Matches and May Matches 
             May                      January-March   
MM Non-MM MM Non-MM MM Non-MM MM Non-MM 
1310 1575 1618 1349 1310 1575 1615 1325 
1311 2513 1619 1393 1311 1690 1617 1394 
1312 1679 1620 1679 1312 1393 1618 1349 
1319 1325 1621 1679 1319 1323 1619 1393 
1343 1541 1622 1393 1343 1541 1620 1393 
1344 1681 1623 1679 1344 1323 1621 1393 
1345 1541 1624 1646 1345 1541 1622 1679 
1398 1680 1625 1349 1398 1596 1623 1393 
1399 1567 1626 1394 1399 1596 1624 1543 
1476 1550 1627 1495 1476 1555 1625 1393 
1477 1554 1628 1349 1477 1391 1626 1460 
1478 1554 1629 1646 1478 1554 1627 1386 
1479 1546 1630 1394 1479 1546 1628 1387 
1480 1394 1631 1495 1480 1387 1629 1393 
1481 1694 1632 1672 1481 1694 1630 1460 
1482 1554 1633 1646 1482 1554 1631 1495 
1483 1567 1635 1394 1483 1567 1632 1672 
1484 1694 1638 1349 1484 1691 1633 1393 
1485 1679 1639 1387 1485 1393 1635 1387 
1486 1393 1642 1387 1486 1679 1638 1394 
1488 1550 1648 1672 1488 1681 1639 1647 
1489 1677 1650 1394 1489 1309 1642 1387 
1490 1644 1651 1541 1490 1495 1643 1460 
1492 1679 1652 1391 1492 1495 1648 1388 
1493 1679 1653 1391 1493 1679 1650 1393 
1494 1394 1654 1596 1494 1387 1651 1690 
1497 1693 1655 1554 1497 1596 1652 1694 
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1498 1495 1656 1385 1498 1388 1653 1554 
1499 1644 1657 1554 1499 1542 1654 1690 
1540 1545 1658 1554 1540 1541 1655 1550 
1551 1542 1659 1555 1551 1542 1656 1554 
1563 1541 1660 1495 1563 1542 1657 1554 
1574 1596 1670 1682 1574 1691 1658 1554 
1577 1546 1671 1552 1577 1309 1659 1555 
1586 1681 1678 1325 1586 1596 1660 1495 
1595 1681 1698 1555 1595 1596 1670 1682 
1597 1550 1699 1323 1597 1555 1671 1541 
1613 1322 2510 1584 1598 1647 1678 1325 
1615 1325 2515 2513 1613 1392 1698 1681 
1617 1636 2516 1541   1699 1685 
      2510 1575 
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